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LEGITIMACY AND SCOPE OF TRUST TERRITORY HIGH 
COURT POWER TO REVIEW DECISIONS OF FEDERATED 
STATES OF MICRONESIA SUPREME COURT: THE 
OTOKICHY CASES 
Addison M. Bowman· 
On August 13, 1982, in a case styled Federated States of Micronesia v. 
Otokichy,l the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia, Ap-
pellate Division,2 rendered its historic first decision and issued its first 
appellate opinion. Writing for a unanimous Court,S Chief Justice Edward 
C. King4 held that the Trial Division of the Supreme Court has jurisdic-
• Professor of La~, William S. Richardson School of Law. A.B., Dartmouth College, 1957; 
LL.B., Dickinson School of Law, 1963; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1964. 
The author serves as consultant to the Federated States of Micronesia Supreme Court. The 
analysis in this article is his own, and is not necessarily embraced by any other person or 
entity. 
1 1 FSM Intrm. 183 (1982). 
• The F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 2 establishes trial and appellate divisions of the Supreme 
Court; see note 3 infra. The August 13, 1982, decision in Otokichy was an appeal from a 
trial division ruling. See companion case, Truk v. Otokichy, 1 FSM Intrm. 127 (1982). 
• The Otokichy Court consisted of Chief Justice King and designated justices Soukichi 
Fritz, Presiding Judge of the Truk District Court, and JanetH. Weeks, Judge of the Supe-
rior Court of Guam. The F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 2 provides that the Supreme Court shall 
consist of the Chief Justice "and not more than 5 associate justices," that the trial division 
can be held by one justice, that the trial division justice may not sit on the appeal from his 
own decision, and that "at least 3 justices shall hear and decide appeals." Since the Su-
preme Court presently consists of Chief Justice King and Associate Justice Richard H. Ben-
son, the appellate division, in any appeal from the trial division, will necessarily consist of 
King or Benson and at least two designated justices. The F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 9(b) em-
powers the Chief Justice to "assign judges among the divisions of a court and give special 
assignments to retired Supreme Court justices and judges of state and other courts." The 
power to appoint and assign designated justices is further elaborated in Section 4 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1979, F.S.M. Code tit. 4, § 104 (1982). 
The Supreme Court's second appellate decision, Alaphonso v. Federated States, 1 FSM 
Intrm. 209 (1982), was rendered by a panel consisting of Chief Justice King and designated 
justices Alfred Laureta, Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, 
and Herbert Soil, Judge of the Commonwealth Court of the Northern Mariana Islands. 
• Chief Justice King became the first Chief Justice of the Federated States of Micronesia 
on March 24, 1981. King's background appears in Turcott, Beginnings of the Federated 
States of Micronesia Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript to be published at 5 U. HA-
WAll L. REV. ___ (1983». 
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tion over criminal cases even where the offenses are alleged to have been 
committed before the effective date of the Federated States of Micronesia 
National Criminal Codell and are thus reachable only under the otherwise 
repealed criminal law of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory.s King's hold-
ing was based entirely upon interpretations of the Federated States of 
Micronesia Constitution7 and the new National Criminal Code. 
On March 11, 1983, the Otokichy decision was reversed8 by the Pacific 
Islands Trust Territory High Court in the exercise of certiorari jurisdic-
tion bestowed upon the High Court by orderS of the United States Secre-
tary of the Interior. The High Court's opinion, authored by Associate Jus-
tice Richard I. Miyamoto,10 flatly disagreed with the Federated States of 
Micronesia Supreme Court's construction of the National Criminal Code, 
and held that jurisdiction in Otokichy and like cases is vested in the Trial 
Divisionll of the Trust Territory High Court. This article will examine 
the Otokichy opinions and will assess the nature and legitimacy of the 
High Court's assertion of power to review Supreme Court decisions treat-
ing strictly internal law matters. 
The article commences with a description of the development of consti-
tutional government in the Federated States of Micronesia that 
culminated in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction by the Federated 
States Supreme Court. Governance by the United States in its role as 
administering authority of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory is, by way 
of contrast, depicted as an expiring function. In particular, the mission of 
the Trust Territory High Court in dispute resolution is virtually com-
pleted. The High Court retains certiorari jurisdiction to review final deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, but the nature and scope of that review 
power have not been delimited. Surprisingly, the High Court, in its first 
exercise of that jurisdiction in Otokichy, failed to raise or to consider the 
issue. This article concludes that the High Court's legitimate power in its 
twilight years in Micronesia does not extend to cases like Otokichy, and 
• F.S.M. Code tit. 11 (1982); see infra text accompanying note 99. 
• See 1 TTC tit. 11 (1980); infra note 90. 
, The F.S.M. Constitution is reprinted in 1 F.S.M. Code at C-3-C-18 (1982) and 2 TTC 
309 (1980 Ed.). 
• Otokichy v. Appellate Division, Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op., (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 11, 
1983). 
• U.S. Department of Interior Secretarial Order No. 3039 (1979), reprinted in 1 TTC 47 
(1980 Ed.); see infra text accompanying notes 112 & 113. I. The High Court panel consisted of Chief Justice Alex R. Munson, Associate Justice 
Miyamoto, and designated justice Alfred Laureta, Judge of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern Mariana Islands. 
11 The High Court has trial and appellate division. See 1 TTC § 52 (1980 Ed.). Pending 
the establishment of functioning court systems in the states of Kosrae, Ponape and Truk, 
the trial and appellate divisions of the High Court function in the interim as surrogate state 
courts, see infra text accompanying notes 77-84. Jurisdiction in cases like Otokichy, held the 
High Court's appellate division, lies in the High Court's trial division in its state court sur-
rogate role. 
1983] FSM: OTOKICHY CASES 59 
that Otokichy-like arrogations of appellate authority by the High Court 
should be disapproved and rescinded by the Interior Secretary because 
they place the United States in violation of the 'very Trusteeship Agree-
ment that defines its legitimate Pacific Islands presence. 
The Federated States of Micronesia. The Federated States of Microne-
sia, one of several emergent Pacific political entities,1I is a nation of 607 
islands covering a huge expanse of ocean north of the equator and west of 
the international dateline.18 The Federated States includes most of the 
Caroline Islands.14 What were .formerly the island districts of Ponape, 
Truk and Yap are now the four Federated States of Kosrae,111 Ponape,16 
Truk17 and Yap.18 The Federated States' 607 islands comprise a land area 
of 270 square miles and support a population of 77,000.19 
For the past hundred years the people of the Caroline Islands have 
been dependent upon four successive foreign powers: Spain (1885-98), 
I. The Compact of Free Association, see infra note 28, has been signed by the govern-
ments of the United States, the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Belau and the Federated 
States. The constitutions of the latter three governments are reprinted in 2 TTC (1980 Ed.). 
The free-association status and the proposed arrangement with the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands are diacussed in Clark, Self-Determination and Free Associa-
tion-Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
1 (1980) . 
.. For current statistical information about the Federated States, see F.S.M. NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT, [1981) NATIONAL YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS [hereinafter cited as 1981 STATIS-
TICS). The Federated States lies between 10 and 120 north latitude, and between 1370 and 
1630 east longitude. 
I. Micronesia consists of four archipelagoes: the Mariana, Caroline, Marshall and Gilbert 
Islands. The Carolines compriae the ialands of Ponape, Truk, Yap and Palau, in east-to-west 
order. The Palau Islands have become the Republic of Belau, see supra note 12; the balance 
of the Carolines is now the Federated States of Micronesia . 
.. Kosrae, consiating of five ialands with a total land area of 42.3 square miles and a 
population of 5,522, was formerly part of the Ponape Diatrict. See 1981 STATISTICS, supra 
note 13, at 4. 
" Ponape consists of 163 ialands with a land area of 133.4 square miles and a population 
of 23,485. Id. The principal ialand, also called Ponape, is one of the largest islands in Micro-
nesia with an area of 129 square miles. The seat of the Government of the Federated States 
is in Kolonia, Ponape. For a wealth of statiatical data about Ponape, see PONAPE STATE 
STATISTICS OFFICE, PONAPE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR 1981. 
17 Truk has 290 ialands, a land area of 49.2 square miles, and a population of 38,648. Truk 
thus claims over half the population of the Federated States. See 1981 STATISTICS, supra 
note 13, at 4. 
" Yap boasts 149 islands, a land area of 45.9 square miles, and a population of 9,319. See 
1981 STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 5. Yap has adopted a state constitution. See infra text 
accompanying notes 56 & 82. 
I. See 1981 STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 5. Of these, about 12,000 are employed as wage 
and salary earners, and over half of these are employed by the government. See 1981 STA-
TISTICS, supra note 13, at 10-11. Subsiatence agriculture and fishing are common. For a soci-
ocultural description of the people of the Federated States, see W. ALKIRE, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF MiCRONESIA 1-18, 33-67 (1977). 
60 UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII LA W REVIEW [Vol. 5 
Germany (1899-1914), Japan (1914-45) and America (since 1945).20 Spain 
obtained the Carolines through papal arbitration, Germany purchased 
them from Spain, Japan colonized and governed them under a League of 
Nations mandate, and the United States seized them in World War 11.21 
Throughout that century the Carolinians have preserved their lan-
guages,lIS maintained their distinctive customs and traditions,2s and sus-
tained a hope for freedom and autonomy.I4 At the present time the Fed-
erated States is part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the 
people are wards of the United States under a Trusteeship Agreement 
approved by the United Nations Security Council and the United States 
in 1947.Z11 
The Trusteeship Agreement designates the United States as "adminis-
tering authority" of the Trust Territory with "full powers of administra-
tion, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory."2s This mandate is 
subject to one important condition: 
In discharging its obligations [as a trustee] the administering authority 
shall . . . foster the development of such political institutions as are suited 
to the trust territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants 
of the trust territory toward self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its 
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to 
this end shall give to the inhabitants of the trust territory a progressively 
increasing share in the administrative services in the territory; shall develop 
•• For a description of this history, see C. HEINE, MiCRONESIA AT THE CROSSROADS (1974); 
N. MELLER, THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA (1969) . 
• , The United States' acquisition of Micronesia included the Carolines, the Marshalls, 
and the Marianas. Meller writes: 
Over 6,000 Americans were killed wresting Micronesia from Japanese control, and the 
temper of the American people hardly countenanced surrendering the islands to any 
other nation; conversely, the United States had early declared it sought no territorial 
gains from World War II. The placing of the area under United Nations trusteeship 
resolved the dilemma, and in 1947, with the TruSteeship Agreement, the islands tech-
nically came under civil administration. 
N. MELLER, supra note 20, at 14. Governance of the Trust Territory was entrusted to the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, from 1947 until 1951, when the responsibility was 
shifted to the Department of the Interior. [d. at 14-17. 
so Each of the four Federated States has a separate language, and there are many dialects. 
Most people speak their own language plus English or Japanese. It is probable that English 
will become the common language of the Federated States. See C. HEINE, supra note 20, at 
92. English is the language of the Government of the Federated States. See 1981 STATISTICS, 
supra note 13 . 
•• W. ALKIRE, supra note 19. 
.. C. HEINE, supra note 20 . 
.. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, 61 Stat. 3301, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1665 (1947), reprinted in 2 F.S.M. Code 895 (1982), and in C. HEINE, supra 
note 20, at 188 . 
•• [d. art. 3. The agreement refers to the U.N. CHARTER, arts. 75-77 (establishing and 
defining an "International Trusteeship System"), reprinted in 2 F.S.M. Code 890 (1982). 
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their participation in government; and give due recognition to the customs 
of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the territory; and shall 
take other appropriate measures toward these ends. . . .17 
61 
In pursuance of this obligation the United States has countenanced a de-
velopmental process, more fully described in the next section of this arti-
cle, resulting in the emergence of the Federated States of Micronesia. 
On October 1, 1982, at Honolulu, Hawaii, the governments of the 
United States and the Federated States signed the Compact of Free Asso-
ciation.ls Subject to termination by either party,19 the Compact envisions 
the Federated States as dependent upon the United States for its security 
and defense30 and for continuing economic assistance.81 With those quali-
fications, the Federated States looks forward to independence. In particu-
lar, the free-association status contemplates unqualified autonomy for the 
Federated States in self-government and internal law.81 The Compact of 
Free Association was approved by plebiscite in the Federated States on 
June 21, 1983, and now awaits approval by the United States Congress 
and by the United Nations.ss 
Development of Self-Government in the Federated States. The United 
States in 1964 sponsored a Congress of Micronesia to inaugurate the de-
., Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, supra note 25, art. 
6. Article 6 also requires that the United States promote "economic advancement and self-
sufficiency" and social and educational advancement. The language quoted in text conforms 
with the requirement of article 76 of the U.N. CHARTER. 
aa The Compact of Free Association, as officially approved in 1982, closely resembles the 
draft initialed in 1980 which was reprinted in 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 283 (1981), and dis-
cussed in Macdonald, Termination of the Strategic Trusteeship: Free Association, the 
United Nations and International Law, id. at 235. Macdonald states that the concept of 
free association implies: "(I) self-government-the associated territory should have a right 
to determine its internal constitution; (2) free expression-the decision should be one freely 
made without compulsion; and (3) mutability-the territory should retain the power and 
right to become independent should it later desire to do so." Id. at 241; see also Clark, 
supra note 12. Clark concludes that the envisioned free-association status comports with 
applicable self-determination requirements. Id. at 74 . 
.. Compact of Free Association §§ 441-43, 451-53 (1982). 
a. Id. tit. 3. In other respects the Federated States is free to conduct its own foreign 
affairs except that it "shall consult, in the conduct of [its) foreign affairs, with the Govern-
ment of the United States." Id. §§ 121, 123. 
a, Id. tit. 2 . 
.. Id. § 111: "The peoples of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia, acting through the Governments established under their respective Constitu-
tions, are self-governing." 
00 The plebiscite result was reported in The National Union (official F.S.M. publication), 
Aug. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Thereafter the Compact becomes effective upon approval "by the 
Government of the United States in accordance with its constitutional processes." Compact 
of Free Association § 41l(e). Final approval of the Compact by the United Nations is con-
templated in U.N. CHARTER arts. 83, 85. 
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velopment of self-government." The Congress of Micronesia in turn au-
thorized a constitutional convention which convened on Saipan in 1975 
and wrote a constitution establishing a tripartite form of democratic gov-
ernment closely resembling its apparent American prototype. so By plebi-
scite held on July 12, 1978, the people of Kosrae, Ponape, Truk and Yap 
adopted and ratified that constitution by majority vote,se and then and 
there created the Federated States of Micronesia. Since then the develop-
ment of constitutional government has proceeded without interruption. 
The first Congress of the Federated States was elected on March 27, 
1979, and it convened on May 10, 1979.S'7 The Legislative Article of the 
Constitution establishes a unicameral Congress with expressly delegated 
legislative power, treaty ratification power, taxation power, impeachment 
and removal power, and power to override a presidential veto.SS The na-
tional legislative power includes defining and establishing penalties for 
"major crimes. "811 All bills must pass two readings to become law. On first 
reading a two-thirds majority is required. "On final reading each state 
delegation shall cast one vote and a 2fa vote of all the delegations is re-
quired."·o Professor Meller notes that this scheme incorporates, in a uni-
cameral legislature apportioned according to population, most of the 
power balancing that is typically achieved in a bicameral body wherein 
.. See N. MELLER, supra note 20. 
III See F.S.M. Const. art. IX (Legislative), X (Executive), and XI (Judicial). According to 
article II, the Constitution "is the supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia." 
Article IV contains a "Declaration of Rights" that closely resembles the Bill of Rights. Arti-
cle VII preserves national, state, and local levels of government, and article VIII ("Powers of 
Government") grants to the national government those powers "expressly delegated" or "in-
disputably national [in] character" but reserves to the states all other power. See generally 
Meller, We the People, THE NEW PAcmc, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 30. 
In Alaphonso v. Federated States, 1 FSM Intrm. 209, 214, 216 (App. Div. 1982), the Court 
noted "that the Constitution and Journal of the [F.S.M.] Constitutional Convention reveal 
the United States Constitution as the historical precedent for most provisions in the Decla-
ration of Rights," and looked to corresponding U.S. Supreme Court precedent "rendered 
prior to and at the times of the Constitutional Convention, and ratification of the Constitu-
tion .... " See also Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. 53 (Trial Div. 1982) (judicial 
power granted to Supreme Court by F.S.M. Const. art. XI similar to that granted federal 
courts by U.S. Const. art. III) . 
.. See Alaphonso v. Federated States, 1 FSM Intrm. at 216 n.5. Pursuant to article XVI 
("Effective Date"), the Constitution took effect one year after ratification. According to 1 
F.S.M. Code intro. (1982), the "establishment of constitutional government [took place] on 
May 10, 1979." 
... Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 56 n.5 (Trial Div. 1982). The seat of the 
national government is Kolonia in Ponape . 
.. F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 2. 
as F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 2(p) ("to define major crimes and prescribe penalties, having 
due regard for local custom and tradition"). Congress exercised this power when it enacted 
the National Criminal Code, F.S.M. Code tit. 11 (1982), in 1981. Section 902 of the Code 
defines "major crimes" as those punishable by three years or more imprisonment and those 
"resulting in loss or theft of property or services in the value of $1,000 or more .... " 
4' F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 20. 
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one house is constituted to provide equal representation to each state re-
gardless of population.·1 
Congress consists "of one member elected at large from each state on 
the basis of state equality, and additional members elected from congres-
sional districts in each state apportioned by population."42 The former 
serve four-year terms, the latter two-year terms. Pursuant to the Execu-
tive Article of the Constitution, the President and Vice-President are 
elected "by Congress for a term of four years by a majority vote of all 
members."·s Only those members of Congress holding four-year terms are 
eligible to become President and Vice-President. This scheme, notes 
Meller, was designed in recognition of the absence of "territory-wide po-
litical parties to support the campaigns of candidates," and to counterbal-
ance the voting strength of Truk State.·· It seems ,ideally suited to a na-
tion as far-flung and locally isolated as the Federated States. In 1979, 
after the convening of the first Congress, President Tosiwo Nakayama 
and Vice-President Petrus Tun were elected by and from its 
membership .• 11 
The Judicial Article of the Federated States of Micronesia Constitution 
vests "the judicial power of the national government" in the Supreme 
Court,·' which has a trial division and aD appellate division.·7 The Su-
preme Court is thus the Micronesian functional equivalent of the entire 
federal judiciary in the United States. As in the United States, the jus-
tices are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Congress, and 
serve "during good behavior."·s On March 24, 1981, President Nakayama 
.. Meller, supra note 35, at 31. 
•• F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 8 . 
.. F.S.M. Const. art. X, § 1. The President "may not serve for more than 2 consecutive 
terms." [d. 
•• Meller, supra note 35, at 30. Meller adds: "The solution [the Constitutional Conven-
tion) arrived at was to have each stste elect one congressman for a four year term, and the 
FSM Congress then to co-opt the president and vjce-president among them. This en-
couraged the popular choice of only persons of presidential timber to fill the longer-term 
congressional seats." [d. Following election, the president and vjce-president "vacate their 
places in the legislative branch and thereafter function much as any other American-type 
executive." [d. For Truk Stste population ststistics, see supra note 17. 
•• The Federated Ststes of Micronesia Information SeMce reports, as this article goes to 
press, that the Third Federated Ststes of Micronesia Congress has just reelected Tosiwo 
Nakayama President of the Federated Ststes of Micronesia. President Nakayama, a native 
of Ulul Island, Truk Stste, prevjously served as senate president of the Congress of Micro-
nesia and as president of the 1975 Constitutional Convention. The new vjce-president of the 
Federated Ststes is Bailey Olter, who hails from Mokil Island in Ponape Stste. Honolulu 
Star-Bulletin, May 11, 1983, at A-lI, col. 4 . 
•• Like U.S. Const. art. III, § I, F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 1 contemplates "a Supreme Court 
and inferior courts estsblished by ststute." But since the Federated Ststes Supreme Court 
has a trial division and an appellate division, id. § 2, see supra note 3, there is no existing 
need for more national courts. 
•• See supra note 46. 
'8, F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 3. 
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administered oaths of office to Chief Justice Edward C. King and Associ-
ate Justice Richard H. Benson.4t1 Chief Justice King sits as trial division 
justice in Ponape and Kosrae, and Justice Benson similarly functions at 
the trial level in Truk and Yap. On any appeal the trial justice is disquali-
fied, and two additional justices are temporarily appointed to form an 
appellate panel of three to decide that case.IIO The Supreme Court's juris-
diction resembles that conferred upon federal courts in the United States, 
including "original jurisdiction in cases arising under this [Federated 
States of Micronesia) Constitution; national law or treaties .... "111 The 
Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution,IIZ 
and the Constitution is the "supreme law" of the nation.IlS 
Like the United States, the Federated States is a federation with na-
tional and state levels of government. The Federated States Constitution 
requires that each state "shall have a democratic constitution."114 The Na-
tional Government is a government of power "expressly delegated [or) 
... indisputably national [in) character."1111 And, as in the United States, 
the states hold the residual power.C16 As of this writing only Yap has de-
veloped and adopted a state constitution, but constitutional conventions 
are underway or completed in Kosrae, Ponape and Truk. 
The Constitution contains a Transition Article that "continues in ef-
fect" all Trust Territory statutes "except to the extent [they are) incon-
sistent with this Constitution [or are) amended or repealed."117 In a recent 
trial-level decision in a seaman's suit against the Trust Territory Govern-
ment styled Lonna v. Trust Territory, CI6 Chief Justice King foreshadowed 
•• Turcott, supra note 4. For a survey of the early history of the Federated States Su-
preme Court, see id. 
00 See supra note 3. 
0' F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 6: 
(a) The trial division of the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in 
cases affecting officials of foreign governments, disputes between states, admiralty or 
maritime cases, and in cases in which the national government is a party except 
where an interest in land is at issue. 
(b) The national courts, including the trial division of the Supreme Court, have con-
current original jurisdiction in cases arising under this Constitution; national law or 
treaties; and in disputes between a state and a citizen of another state, between citi-
zens of different states, and between a state or a citizen thereof, and a foreign state, 
citizen, or subject. 
(c) When jurisdiction is concurrent, the proper court may be prescribed by statute. 
U [d. §§ 6-8; Alaphonso v. Federated States, 1 FSM Intrm. 209 (App. Div. 1982). 
U F.S.M. Const. art. II states: "This Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of 
the people and is the supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia. An act of the 
Government in conftict with this Constitution is invalid to the extent of conftict." 
.. [d. art. VII, § 2 . 
.. [d. art. VIII, § 1. 
.. [d. § 2: "A power not expressly delegated to the national government or prohibited to 
the states is a state power." 
o. [d. art. XV, § 1. 
.. 1 FSM Intrm. 53 (Trial Div. 1982). 
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the decision in Otokichy by holding that the Seaman's Protection Act,II' 
although enacted as a part of the Trust Territory Code by the Congress 
of Micronesia,80 "relates to matters that now fall within the legislative 
powers of the [Federated States] national goverment ... and has there-
fore become a national law of the Federated States of Micronesia"s1 by 
operation of the Transition Article. Thus, held King, Lonno's suit fell 
within Supreme Court jurisdiction because it "arose under" national 
law.62 The result is that national law assimilates those parts of the Trust 
Territory Code that treat subject matter within the constitutional reach 
of the Congress of the Federated States." 
The Federated States, after a century of alien dominion and govern-
ance, has quickly seized the opportunity for self-government extended by 
America pursuant to its obligation as international trustee. The Constitu-
tion, which was ratified in 1978, became effective by its own terms in 
1979," and by 1981 all three branches of the national government were 
fully functional. The Compact of Free Association has been signed and 
awaits final approval. America's trusteeship responsibilities are approach-
ing expiration.611 
Transitional Trust Territory Administration. Pursuant to Executive Or-
der No. 11021,66 dated May 9, 1962, the Secretary of the Interior is 
charged with responsibility "to carry out the obligations assumed by the 
United States as the administering authority of the trust territory under 
the terms of the trusteeship agreement . . . . ,,.., The charge includes the 
power to administer civil government, to exercise executive, legislative 
and judicial functions, and to designate and appoint personnel for these 
purposes.68 The Trust Territory High Court is the creature of this execu-
tive authority.88 Established by order of the Interior Secretary to carry 
out a centralized judicial function in Micronesia, the High Court has trial 
•• 1 TTC §§ 201-32 (1980 Ed.). 
00 Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. at 72 . 
• , Id.; see infra note 104 . 
•• See supra text accompanying note 51. Alternatively, held King in Lonno, the case feU 
within the Supreme Court's original and exclusive admiralty jurisdiction conferred by 
F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 6(a). See supra note 51. 
•• The F.S.M. Code (1982) is a good example of the proposition in text. It contains, in 57 
titles, those statutes enacted by the F.S.M. Congress plus those portions of the Trust Terri-
tory Code not "exclusively within the jurisdiction of the States of the Federated States of 
Micronesia." F.S.M. Code intro. at i (1982). By the same reasoning, state law would assinli-
late the non-inconsistent balance of the Trust Territory Code. 
.. See supra note 36. 
.. See supra note 33. Termination of the trust is discussed in Clark, supra note 12 . 
.. Reprinted in 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) . 
.. Exec. Order No. 11,021. Id. § 1. 
.. Id. §§ 1-2 . 
•• 1 TTC §§ 51-55 (1980 Ed.); Secretarial Order No. 2918 (as amended March 24, 1976), 
part IV (judicial authority), reprinted in 1 TTC 23, 29 (1980 Ed.). 
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and appellate divisions and territory-wide jurisdiction over "all causes, 
civil and criminal."70 High Court justices are appointed by and serve at 
the pleasure of the Interior Secretary.71 The Appellate Division of the 
High Court is located at Saipan in the Northern Mariana Islands. 
With commendable foresight, the Secretary of the Interior anticipated 
the need to provide for delegation and transfer of governmental functions 
during the period of transition to self-government and cessation of official 
American presence in Micronesia.72 The Secretary in 1979 promulgated 
Secretarial Order No. 3039 "to provide the maximum permissible amount 
of self-government, consistent with the responsibilities of the Secretary 
under Executive Order 11021, for the Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, and Palau, pursuant to their respective constitutions as 
and when framed, adopted, and ratified, pending termination of the 1947 
Trusteeship Agreement ... .''78 Section 2 of Secretarial Order No. 3039 
expressly delegates "executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the 
Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. . . to the three 
political subdivisions of the Trust Territory known as the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau."74 This delegation, 
which became effective upon the commencement of "constitutional gov-
ernment,"711 enables the courts of the Federated States to assume jurisdic-
tion "as the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia autho-
rizes such jurisdiction. "78 
Section 5 of Secretarial Order No. 3039 provides that the Trust Terri-
tory judiciary, which includes Community and District Courts and the 
trial and appellate divisions of the Trust Territory High Court, will con-
tinue to function "until the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall 
Islands, and Palau have established functioning Courts pursuant to the 
7. 1 TTC § 53 (19SO Ed.). 
71 Id. § 1(2). The Interior Secretary may also "make temporary appointments when a 
vacancy exists, and in addition may appoint temporary judges to serve on the high court." 
Id. In In re Iriarte,"1 FSM Intrm. 255, 267 (Trial Div. 1983), the court notes that High 
Court personnel are selected and appointed without prior consultation with the Federated 
States. 
n In 1978 the Secretary promulgated Secretarial Order No. 3027, reprinted in 1 TIC 44 
(19SO Ed.), in recognition of the emerging Federated States, Marshall Islands and Palau 
governments. Order 3027 canceled the Congress of Micronesia and reorganized the Trust 
Territory Government "to give appropiate effect to governments based on locally developed 
constitutions in the Marshall Islands, the Palau District, and the Districts which will com-
prise the Federated States of Micronesia." 
71 Secretarial Order No. 3039 § I, reprinted in 2 F.S.M. Code 950 (1982). 
,. Id. § 2. This express delegation is recognized by the High Court in Otokichy v. Appel-
late Division, Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 11, 1983), and discussed by 
the Supreme Court in Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. at 57-59. 
71 Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 73, § 7. Constitutional government commenced 
in 1979, see supra note 36, and the executive and legislative delegations occurred in that 
year, see supra text accompanying notes 37 and 44. Transfer of the judicial function to the 
Supreme Court took place in 1981, see infra text accompanying notes 79 & SO. 
78 Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. at 58. 
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terms of their respective constitutions."77 The determination that "func-
tioning courts" exist is to be made by the Chief Justice of the High 
Court,78 and the Federated States Supreme Court was so certified on May 
5, 1981,79 The Supreme Court has held that Section 2 delegation of juris-
diction and judicial functions to the Supreme Court became fully effec-
tive on that date.80 Like its United States counterpart, however, the Su-
preme Court is a court of limited juisdiction;81 it received on May 5, 1981, 
only that portion of the judicial function which it is constitutionally enti-
tled and bound to exercise. The balance belongs to the state courts in the 
four Federated States. At this writing, however, only Yap State has estab-
lished a functioning state court system. 81 
In the absence of functioning court systems in the states of Kosrae, 
Ponape and Truk,88 the trial and appellate court structure of the Trust 
Territory Government, including trial and appellate divisions of the High 
Court, continues in those states to exercise whatever jurisdiction "does 
not fall within the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
Federated States of Micronesia."S. In other words, the High Court serves 
in Kosrae, Ponape and Truk as interim surrogate for the as-yet-unestab-
lished state court systems. The Court pointed out in Lonna v. Trust Ter-
ritory that the allocation of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and 
the High Court during this transitional period "will be determined on the 
•• Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 73, § Sa . 
•• [d. "The determination that such functioning courts exist shall be made in writing by 
the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands upon writ-
ten request of the chief judicial officer of the respective jurisdictions. A denial of the request 
may be appealed to the Secretary." 
The F.S.M. Judiciary Act of 1979, F.S.M. Code tit. 4 (1982), provides in § 206 ("initial 
organization of Supreme Court") that the "Supreme Court is deemed organized when . . . 
the Chief Justice of the Trust Territory High Court, upon written request by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia certifies. . . that the 
Supreme Court is prepared to hear matters." 
•• See Federated States v. Otokichy, 1 FSMIntrm. 183, 193 n.8 (App. Div. 1982); 
Otokichy v. Appellate Division, Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. at 2 n.3 (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 11, 
1983) . 
•• Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. at 58. This result is implicit in the transfer 
and delegation provisions of Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 73, § 7: "This Order 
becomes effective, as to each of them, upon the date when each of the respective jurisdic-
tions, namely, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, have 
commenced a constitutional government .... " Constitutional government in the Federated 
States commenced in 1979, see supra notes 75 and 36, and thus delegation of the judicial 
function merely awaited the certification of the Supreme Court. 
11 See supra note 51. 
•• The Yap State court system was certified pursuant to Secretarial Order No. 3039 by 
the Trust Territory Chief Justice on March 9, 1982. See Otokichy v. Appellate Division, 
Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. at 9, (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 3, 1983) . 
•• Truk State has held a constitutional convention, and conventions are underway or com-
pleted in Kosrae and Ponape. See Turcott, supra note 4. State court systems will likely be 
established in the near future in all three states . 
.. Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. at 68. 
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basis of jurisdictional provisions within the Constitution and laws of the 
Federated States of Micronesia and its respective states."811 Thus, the 
Trust Territory courts "continue to function"88 in the Federated States to 
fill a void, as the High Court recognized in its opinion in Otokichy.87 The 
High Court noted that the absence of state courts in Truk, Ponape and 
Kosrae creates a "void [which] is filled by the continuing existence of the 
Trust Territory courts. . . within the FSM states where state courts have 
not been established."BS This brings us directly to Otokichy, which raised 
a question of trial-level jurisdiction in a case filed in Truk. The precise 
question was whether the High Court's Trial Division, sitting as state 
court surrogate, or the Supreme Court's Trial Division, exercising its con-
stitutionally mandated jurisdiction, should hear the case in the first 
instance. 
The Merits 0/ Otokichy. Otokichy arose out of serious criminal charges 
involving group torture and allegations of attempted murder, aggravated 
assault and conspiracy. The events occurred on Onei Island, Truk, on 
May 4, 1981. The State of Truk brought charges in the Trust Territory 
High Court8S alleging violations of applicable provisions of the Trust Ter-
ritory Code.so Prior to trial, the Federated States of Micronesia Govern-
ment intervened by way of motion under Special Joint Rule No.1, seek-
ing transfer to the Federated States Supreme Court. 
Special Joint Rule No.1, signed on July 13, 1981, by the respective 
Chief Justices of the Trust Territory High Court and the Federated 
States Supreme Court, expresses as its purpose "that the Supreme Court 
"Id . 
.. ~ language is that of Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 73, § 5a. 
17 Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. at 9 (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 11, 1983) . 
.. Id. at 9-13. The High Court also 888erted, in diets, that it will "continue to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Govern-
ment or the High Commi88ioner filed within FSM, Palau, and the Marshall Islands .... " 
Id. at 13. This assertion appears designed to expre88 disapproval of the Supreme Court's 
holding in Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. 53, which was to the contrary. The 
question of jurisdiction over suits brought against the Trust Territory Government turns on 
construction of the following language in Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 73, § 5a: 
"Once such a determination [that local functioning courts exist] has been made for a juris-
diction, all cases, except for suits against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Govern-
ment or the High CommiBBioner, currently pending but not in active trial before the Com-
munity Courts, the District Courts, and the Trial Division of the High Court, shall be 
transferred to the functioning courts of such jurisdiction." Lonna held that this language, 
plus the general delegation of functions provision of § 2, transferred the High Court's for-
mer exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Trust Territory Government to the courts 
of the Federated States . 
.. There are two criminal cases, Nos. 13-81 and 16-81, and twelve defendants were 
charged with the same crimes. 
N 1 TTC tit. 11, §§ 4(2) (attempted murder), 202 (aggravated assault), and 401 (conspir-
acy to commit murder and aggravated assault). The po88ible penalties were 30 months to 30 
years imprisonment, 10 years imprisonment, and 5 years imprisonment, respectively. 
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of the Federated States of Micronesia immediately shall exercise the full 
scope of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws 'of the Federated 
States of Micronesia, and that the Supreme Court shall determine the 
scope of its own jurisdiction. "Ill Recognizing that the "High Court shall 
remain active in the Federated States of Micronesia to hear only those 
cases which do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court," the 
rule provides that in any case originally filed in the High Court either 
party may assert by motion that the case properly falls within the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, and mandates that upon such a motion the 
High Court "shall promptly certify the question of jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court. . . .''111 Special Joint Rule No.1 is thus an explicit recogni-
tion of the Supreme Court's primacy on questions of its own constitu-
tional jurisdiction. The Trial Division of the High Court granted the 
Federated States' motion and transferred Otokichy to the Trial Division 
of the Supreme Court, which held that, because the crimes charged oc-
curred before the effective date of the new National Criminal Code,lIlI and 
since the charges were brought under the Trust Territory Code," the Su-
preme Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.1III The Federated 
States appealed, and the stage was set. The outcome would hinge on de-
termination of the question of national law." 
Chief Justice King's opinion for the Court in Otokichy, joined by desig-
nated justices Soukichi Fritz" and Janet H. Weeks," squarely held that 
the case arose under national law and, accordingly, fell within Supreme 
Court trial jurisdiction. The analysis was straightforward and trenchant. 
The National Criminal Code was signed into law on January 7, 1981, but 
by its own terms did not become effective until July 12, 1981." The crim-
jnal law governing the Otokichy crimes, which were perpetrated on May 
4, 1981, was Trust Territory Code Title 11, whereunder the charg~ were 
brought. When the Federated States of Micronesia commenced constitu-
tional government in 1979/00 Title 11 became the criminal law of the 
Federated States by operation of the Constitution's transition provision 
., Special Joint Rule No.1, High Court, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; Supreme 
Court, Federated States of Micronesia: Joint Order for Transfer of Cases and Resolution of 
Jurisdictional Issues, July 13, 1981 (unpublished admin. order). Special Joint Rule No.1 is 
signed by Chief Justice King and by former High Court Chief Justice Harold M. Burnett. 
.. Id . 
•• The F.S.M. National Criminal Code, F.S.M. Code tit. 11 (1982), did not become effec-
tive until July 12, 1981. 
.. See supra note 90. 
M The holding was spelled out in a companion case, Truk v. Otokichy, 1 FSM Intrm. 127 
(Trial Div. 1982) (Benson, J.) • 
.. F.S.M. Const. art. XI, §6(b); see supra note 51. 
.. See supra note 3 . 
.. Id . 
.. F.S.M. Code tit. 11, § 3 (1982). 
'00 See supra notes 36 and 75. 
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"continu[ing] in effect" all applicable Trust Territory statutes.101 The 
question was whether the Title 11 attempted murder and assault provi-
sions were assimilated into national law or, more precisely, whether cases 
charging violations of those provisions now "arise under" national law 
and therefore fall within Supreme Court jurisdiction. A negative answer 
to the question would mean that the Otokichy offenses would be within 
the residual jurisdiction of state courts and therefore proper in the first 
instance in the trial division of the High Court. Since Congress has the 
power to define and prescribe punishments for "major crimes,"102 and 
since the National Criminal Code embodied that power and defined "ma-
jor crimes" as those punishable by three years or more imprisonment/os 
the offenses alleged in Otokichy would qualify as "major crimes" were 
they so assimilated. Assimilation so conceived, however, presents a sort of 
chicken-and-egg problem. The offenses become "major crimes" if assimi-
lated, but can't be assimilated unless they are "major crimes."l04 Perhaps 
in recognition of this difficulty, the Supreme Court turned to the repealer 
provisions of the National Criminal Code. 
Section two of the National Criminal Code repeals "to the full extent of 
National Government jurisdiction"loll Title 11 of the Trust Territory 
Code. However, in order to avoid a hiatus of inadvertently immunized 
criminality, on one hand, and an ex post facto problem, on the other, 
Section 102 of the Code provides that it "does not apply to offenses com-
mitted before its effective date" and that prosecutions for such offenses 
,., F.S.M. Const. art. XV, § 1; see supra text accompanying notes 57-63. 
,., F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 2(p); see supra text accompanying note 39. Congress's power 
to define and thus "nationalize" major crimes presents a sharp contrast with the United 
States Congress's crime legislating power which, with a few specified exceptions such as 
counterfeiting, piracy and other offenses on the high seas (see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8) is 
entirely derivative from other powers like commerce regulation and taxation. See generally 
W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 106, 112 (1972). 
What are "major crimes"? The constitutional history is limited: 
Your Committee feels that a rational clear-cut distinction between the authority of 
the national government and that of the state governments ought to be made in the 
area of criminal law and that the distinction ought to be based on the severity of the 
crime. Your Committee also feels that the national government ought to take local 
custom into consideration in legislating regarding crimes. Your Committee has there-
fore provided that the national government should have authority over major crimes, 
should be empowered to distinguish between "major" and "minor" crimes and that in 
enacting such legislation should take local custom into account. 
2 J. Micro Con Con of 1975, S.C. REP. No. 33 'II 18, at 813, 819, Oct. 10, 1975. 
, •• National Criminal Code, F.S.M. Code tit. 11, § 902(a) (1982). Section 902(b) added to 
the "major crimes" category "all crimes resulting in loss or theft of property or services in 
the value of $1,000 or more, as well as any attempt to commit such crimes." 
104 The subject matter of Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. 53 (Trial Div. 1982), 
was admiralty and therefore C8Dle within Congress's power "to regulate navigation and ship-
ping." See F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 2(h); text supra accompanying notes 57-62. Assimilation 
of the Seaman's Protection Act into national law was therefore direct and uncomplicated, in 
contrast with a classification of "major crimes" awaiting definition by Congress. 
, •• National Criminal Code, F.S.M. Code tit. 11, § 2 (1982). 
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"are governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that pur-
pose, as if the Code were not in force. moe Otokichy, involving crimes al-
legedly committed on May 4, 1981, was such a prosecution. But for Sec-
tion lO2, reasoned King, the repealer clause of the Code would have 
barred the Otokichy prosecution. 1M Since Title 11 prosecutions are thus 
"preserved" by Section lO2, they arise under national law. In support of 
this result King noted that, since Congress would have no power to au-
thorize or affect prosecutions in courts outside the Federated States of 
Micronesia system, the "normal implicationm08 of Section 102's preserva-
tion of prosecutions for "major crime" category offenses is that Supreme 
Court jurisdiction attaches. In effect, Congress" 'froze' the [application of 
substantive criminal law to] defendants so that guilt or innocence would 
be determined under the law in effect at the time the alleged crime was 
committed. moe Title 11 is thus "continued in effect" for cases like 
Otokichy only because of Section 102, and the Trust Territory criminal 
statutes owe whatever waning vitality they possess to the new National 
Criminal Code. Congress, King added, "recognized that this Court would 
have jurisdiction over all such cases by virtue of ... the Constitution."llo 
The Otokichy mandate instructed the Supreme Court Trial Division to 
retain jurisdiction of the prosecution.111 
Otokichy in the High Court. The High Court's Appellate Division had 
final say in Otokichy because of its certiorari jurisdiction. Secretarial Or-
der No. 3039, m in addition to providing a state court surrogate role for 
both divisions of the High Court, allows a continuing review function in 
the appellate division: "[T]he Appellate Division of the High Court shall 
retain jurisdiction by writ of certiorari to entertain appeals from the 
courts of last resort of the respective jurisdictions of the Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau."l18 In its first exercise of 
, .. Id. § 102. Retroactive extension of substantive provisions of the criminal code would in 
all likelihood have violated F.S.M. Const. art. IV. § 11 ("a bill of attainder or ex post facto 
law may not be passed"); cf. Weaver v. Graham. 450 U.S. 24 (1981); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 
DaIl.) 386 (1798). 
'07 "The result would have been dictated by the Section 2 repeal clause," noted King, 
"but also could have occurred if the universal common law rule of abatement of prosecution 
under repealed statutes had been applied by the courts." Federated States v. Otokichy. 1 
FSM Intrm. at 189-90. The rule of abatement is discussed in Bradley v. United States, 410 
U.S. 605 (1973). which was cited by King for that proposition. 
'08 1 FSM Intrm. at 191. 
,.,. Id. 
"Old. at 193. 
111 This instruction was in the form of a writ of prohibition addressed to the trial division 
and prohibiting transfer of the cases back to the High Court. "The Trial Division is in-
structed to retain jurisdiction and to proceed in the cases in whatever manner the Trial 
Division deems appropriate." Id. at 194. 
m Supra note 73. 
mId. § 5b. The implication is that the certiorari jurisdiction will last until the trustee-
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that function, the High Court reversed the Supreme Court and claimed 
subject matter jurisdiction for its own trial division in Otokichy "and 
cases of like import." The opinion by Justice Miyamoto is remarkable in 
two respects: it fails entirely to confront or dispute the analysis support-
ing the Supreme Court's holding that Otokichy "arises under" national 
law; and it neglects to raise or discuss the appropriate scope of the High 
Court's certiorari jurisdiction. 
On the merits, Justice Miyamoto recognized that the judicial function 
in the Federated States is "shared between the national, state and local 
governments,"1l4 and that the High Court serves as a surrogate "court 
within the FSM states where state courts have not been established."llIi 
He noted that the Trust Territory law was the applicable law, and char-
acterized the Federated States' argument in support of the Supreme 
Court's exercise of jurisdiction as a contention "that the National Crimes 
Act in fact made the Trust Territory Title 11 crimes national crimes by 
the retroactive effect of the National Criminal Code."lls So characterized, 
the contention was brushed aside as "convoluted" and "totally without 
merit."l17 Miyamoto simply quoted National Criminal Code Section 
102,118 the linchpin in the Supreme Court holding, and concluded: "Any-
thing as clear as this section does not require interpretation by this court 
of matters advanced to support retroactivity."118 In a curious after-
thought, Miyamoto asserted that nothing in the new National Criminal 
Code "lessens the vitality of Title 11 of the Trust Territory Code, under 
the circumstances of this case."lIO That was the full extent of the High 
Court's treatment of the merits, except for the concluding generalization 
that the Supreme Court "cannot exercise jurisdiction over matters which 
are within the exclusive province of the state courts."121 
What about Special Joint Rule No. 1 and the Supreme Court's right to 
determine its own jurisdiction? In response to the Federated States' argu-
ment that the Supreme Court's decision should be dispositive because of 
the rule, the High Court, with hyperbole characteristic of the entire opin-
ion, dismissed the point as the product of a "gross misunderstanding as to 
what the Special Joint Rule is."lII The rule, opined the High Court, "was 
simply a memorandum adopted to express general agreements to create 
ship is terminated . 
... Otokichy v. Appellate Division, Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. at 8 (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 
11,1983). 
116 Id. at 13. 
ue Id. at 11. 
mId. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
m Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. at 11 (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 11, 1983). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 12. 
III Id. at 13. 
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an atmosphere for smooth transition and cooperation. mil The "atmo-
sphere" and language of Otokichy in the High Court are sarcastic and 
petulant, and the special rule is simply disregarded. The disregard of the 
rule is especially remarkable in view of the High Court's express recogni-
tion that its holding was based upon a rejection of the Supreme Court's 
definitive construction of Federated States national law, and that the ju-
risdictional bounty of Otokichy will accrue to the High Court strictly as 
state court surrogate.114 
The thrust of the High Court decision, it seems fair to conclude, is that 
proper resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue thought to have 
been presented is so clear that the rejection of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning did not require discussion or analysis, and the joint rule could 
have no operative effect. Keeping in mind that the Otokichy litigants 
were Truk State and people from Truk, and that decision in both courts 
turned on construction of the Constitution and statutes of the Federated 
States, Otokichy appears to represent an arrogation of plenary appellate 
jurisdiction over national courts of last resort by the High Court in its 
holdover years in Micronesia. 
Perhaps most suprising is the High Court's failure to address the legiti-
mate scope of its own power under Secretarial Order No. 3039.116 In addi-
tion to arguing Supreme Court primacy under the Federated States Con-
stitution and Special Joint Rule No. I, the Federated States asked the 
High Court to abstain from decision. Justice Miyamoto responded: 
"Surely, we cannot abdicate responsibility because the problem presented 
in this case is one of the prime reasons why the High Court was given 
certiorari jurisdiction."118 But the "problem" and the "reason" thus im-
plied were not specified or discussed. The implication is that the High 
Court harbors some unarticulated grievance against the Supreme Court, 
almost as if the opinion were designed to chastise by innuendo. The Su-
preme Court was reversed, "and the Trust Territory High Court ... 
vested with the jurisdiction to try and dispose of this case and cases of 
like import. "117 
The Otokichy Analysis. One startling aspect of the High Court result in 
Otokichy is its apparent gratuitousness. It is difficult to imagine a subject 
matter of less concern or interest to the United States, the Trust Terri-
tory Government, or the High Court than the jurisdictional allocation of 
such a diminishing class of local litigants as that represented by 
Otokichy. Not only is the class of litigants diminishing; so is the function 
of the High Court's trial division. Soon Truk, Ponape and Kosrae will 
.. S [d. 
... See supra text accompanying notes 83-88 . 
... See supra text accompanying notes 112-13 . 
•• , Cert. No. C-2-82, slip op. at 12 (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 11, 1983) . 
.. , [d. at 14. 
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have state court systems, and Otokichy's progeny will be theirs. Why did 
the High Court care about internal jurisdictional allocation in the Feder-
ated States?1lI8 Why did the High Court choose to address the balance of 
national and state power? The High Court's opinion sheds no light on 
these problems. 
The remainder of this analysis will focus on four issues: What about the 
merits of the jurisdiction issue in Otokichy? Did the High Court abuse its 
certiorari jurisdiction? Does the High Court result in Otokichy violate 
the Trusteeship Agreement? Should the Supreme Court follow Otokichy 
in subsequent cases? 
What about the merits of Otokichy? Was the Supreme Court right? 
Did Congress intend the result King reached? On two points the intent of 
Congress was express: to define, and thus assert national jurisdiction over, 
"major crimes" as allowed in the Constitution;129 and to repeal "to the 
full extent of National Government jurisdiction" the Trust Territory 
criminal code. Section 102's governance of interregnum prosecutions "as 
if the Code were not in force" suggests, literally and superficially, that the 
High Court should prevail in the jurisdictional tug-of-war. Had the Na-
tional Criminal Code not been written, for example, it would have been 
impossible confidently to assert Supreme Court jurisdiction because, even 
though the Constitution's transition provision incorporated Title 11 into 
the law of the Federated States, ISO there would have been no definition of 
"major crimes" and hence no means of sorting out national cases and 
state cases. 
The problem of sorting out national and state cases needs to be kept in 
mind to avoid the High Court's apparent mistake of viewing Otokichy as 
a clash between the Federated States criminal law and the Trust Terri-
tory Code. The Supreme Court employed the former, not to sap the vital-
ity of the latter, but to demonstrate that the Trust Territory Code was 
assimilated into national, rather than state, law. There is no impediment 
to this result. It can be reached in several ways. To begin with, King's 
analysis is entirely adequate as a matter of statutory construction. Con-
gress intended to define major crimes, and it intended to augment trans-
fer of the judicial function to the Supreme Court. lSI Is it not plausible to 
infer from Congress's obvious intent a further desire to preempt major 
crime jurisdiction and deliver the maximum possible amount of it to the 
Supreme Court? Congress's predominant purpose, as King pointed out, 
,0, The opinion gives no indication of the High Court's interest . 
... National Criminal Code, F.S.M. Code tit. 11, §§ 901-902 (1982). The Code was the 
embodiment of the Constitutional power. See F.S.M. Const. art. IX, § 2(p) . 
... Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. 53 (Trial Div. 1982); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 57-62. 
III F.S.M. Code tit. 11, § 901 (1982), announces that "[tlhe National Government of the 
Federated States of Micronesia has exclusive jurisdiction over all major crimes," and § 902 
defines "major crimes." See supra note 39. The intent to facilitate transfer of the judicial 
function to the Supreme Court appears in S.C. REp. No. 1-299, 1st Cong., 4th Sess. (1981). 
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was substantive: it wanted to write a law defining serious crimes; it 
wanted to repeal the old law; and it wanted to avoid an interregnum of 
potential immunity. If Congress had thought about the issue at all, it 
would likely have wanted to deliver maximum jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court, and that was the Supreme Court's holding. The High Court 
never suggested in Otokichy that Congress could not place jurisdiction 
over Trust Territory Code offenses in the Supreme Court. Indeed, the 
transition provision of the Constitution would ha,ve done precisely that 
except for the absence of a definition of "major crimes. "181 Thus the 
power existed and the question, as both courts recognized, was one of 
construction of national law. 
The Supreme Court held that Otokichy arises under national law be-
cause the National Criminal Code preserves and classifies interim prose-
cutions for certain Trust Territory offenses already assimilated into the 
law of the Federated States. This is fully consistent with the meaning of 
"arising under. . . national law" intended by the Constitutional Conven-
tion. The relevant committee report1l3 reads: 
In general, the national courts have trial court jurisdiction under this propo-
sal in cases involving national law or the national constitution, and in cer-
tain other specific categories of cases, either interstate or international in 
character, and therefore beyond the competence of the state courts . . . . 
The term "arising under" ... mean[s] cases involving the enforcement of a 
right protected or created by the national constitution, national law or a 
treaty and cases involving the construction or interpretation of the national 
constitution, national law or a treaty.lll4 
The effect of the National Criminal Code in preserving interim prosecu-
tions does not conflict with these stated purposes. 
Another way of approaching the Otokichy issue is to ask what would 
have happened in a murder or attempted murder case had the National 
Criminal Code not been written. Because of the constitutional transition 
provision the relevant Trust Territory statute would have become a law 
of the Federated States, and because of Secretarial Order No. 3039 juris-
diction would lie in the Supreme Court or in a state court. High Court 
jurisdiction could thus be posited only in the High Court's role as Truk 
state court surrogate. Under the Constitution, and in the absence of any 
jurisdictional allocation by Congress, the Supreme Court would have ju-
risdiction over the case if it involved a "major crime" and thus became 
assimilated into national law. 1811 Would not the Supreme Court, in such a 
case, have the power (if not the duty) to supply a common-law definition 
UI See supra note 130 . 
... Committee on Governmental Functions, S.C. REP. No. 49,117,2 J. Micro Con. Can of 
1975, at 876, 879 (1976) . 
... Id. 
... See supra text accompanying notes 129-30. 
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of "major crimes" in order to decide the jurisdictional issue?186 And, in 
deciding upon the propriety of exercising such a power, would it not be 
relevant to know that Congress had decided, albeit in an enactment not 
yet effective, to draw the line between major and minor crimes at three 
years? In short, is it all that clear what would have happened "if the Code 
were not in force?" The High Court appears to have begged that 
question. 
More important than deciding now which court had a firmer grip on 
Otokichy, however, is the question of the High Court's power. The Judi-
cial Article of the Constitution vests the "judicial power of the national 
government ... [in the] Supreme Court,"187 and confers upon the Su-
preme Court the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution and all na-
tionallaw.188 The High Court challenges that power, and disputes the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and a national statute. 
But under the Constitution the Supreme Court simply cannot be wrong 
in its interpretation of national law. The High Court's power cannot de-
rive from the Constitution; its source must be elsewhere, and the only 
possibility is Secretarial Order No. 3039.189 
Why was the High Court given the power of review on certiorari? Did 
the High Court abuse that power? The most troublesome aspect of 
Otokichy is that the High Court never addressed the issue of limitations 
on its own power. In 1982 the High Court adopted a set of rules to govern 
writs of certiorari,I'o but said ~)Dly that the writ "is not a matter of right, 
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are 
special and important reasons therefor."141 This rule was not mentioned 
by the High Court in Otokichy. Special Joint Rule No.1, conceding the 
Supreme Court's primacy on Otokichy-like questions, was disregarded. 
After the High Court's decision, the Federated States asked for reconsid-
eration and argued explicitlylU the question of abuse of certiorari power, 
but the High Court denied the motion without opinion.1'8 Virtually ines-
.18 Such a duty could be derived from the Constitution's command that some crimes were 
too serious to entrust to state court adjudication. See supra note 102 and text accompanying 
notes 133-34 . 
• 17 F.S.M. Const. art. XI, § 1. 
118 Id. §§ 6-8. 
11. Reprinted in 1 TTC 47 (1980 Ed.) . 
.. 0 High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Rules for Writ of Certiorari, 
adopted and filed June 25, 1982 . 
... Id. Rule 5 . 
... Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, Otokichy v. Appellate Division, Cert. No. 
C-2-82, (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 18, 1983). The Federated States argued: "It simply makes no 
sense at all to reason that the High Court has certiorari- power largely in order to review 
matters of purely internal FSM law and the allocation of jurisdiction between the FSM's 
state and national courts. What possible need is there for a Trust Territory forun! to resolve 
such issues? Why is the FSM forun! not completely adequate and, in fact, more appropriate 
to the resolution of such internal issues?" Id. at 5 . 
... Otokichy v. Appellate Division, Cert. No. C-2-82 (T.T.C. App. Div. Mar. 23, 1983) 
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capable, in these circumstances, is the conclusion that the High Court, 
aware of the legitimate and pressing issue of its own power, prefers to 
stonewall its spectators. 
The certiorari power should be limited to review of decisions that ar-
guably threaten fulfillment of United States trusteeship responsibilities 
or endanger human rights. Secretarial Order No. 3039 can be construed as 
qualifying the grant of certiorari in this way. The purpose of the order, it 
will be recalled with some irony, is to provide the "maximum permissible 
amount of self-government" to the Federated States by releasing and 
transferring government functions. The transfer of executive functions is, 
however, expressly qualified to allow the High Commissioner the retained 
authority to carry out trusteeship obligations.144 In the same way, the 
transfer of legislative functions is qualified to retain in the High Commis-
sioner power to disapprove legislation "inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Order, the Trusteeship Agreement, with existing treaties, laws, and 
regulations of the United States .... "I411 The transfer of judicial func-
tions is qualified only by the retention of the High Court's certiorari re-
view, and the scope of that power is not delineated. Given the purpose 
and general thrust of Order No. 3039, however, plenary appellate review 
in the High Court seems the least likely answer to the question the High 
Court did not raise. 
The most reasonable interpretation of the proper scope of certiorari 
review, in light of the maximum self-government motive, is that it is lim-
ited in the same way the order limits retained executive and legislative 
powers. The limitation allows the vestigial remnants of the Trust Terri-
tory Government no more power than that required to fulfill trusteeship 
responsibilities and to safeguard human rights. Indeed, proper discharge 
of the function of trustee demands the restraint implicit in the limitation. 
The High Court avoided the question and reversed Otokichy because it 
preferred its construction of Federated States law, and it expressly rested 
the decision on the certiorari jurisdiction conferred in the order. So de-
fined, that jurisdiction violates the Trusteeship Agreement. 
The Trusteeship Agreement not only requires the promotion of self-
government but also dictates that self-government be a "progressively in-
creasing" reality. In the Federated States, the High Court's presence is 
vestigial and its function is expiring. Its power must progressively dimin-
ish as the judicial power of the emergent Pacific nations matures. 
Otokichy is simply a step in the wrong direction. Special Joint Rule No. 1 
should be reinstated. Its abrogation violates trusteeship obligations. And 
for the same reason, the High Court holding in Otokichy should be re-
scinded by the Interior Secretary. The High Court should not be permit-
ted to stamp its preferences on the developing law of this young nation. 
(order denying petition for reconsideration) . 
... Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 139, § 3a . 
... Id. § 4a. 
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For the United States to pay lip service to self-government and free asso-
ciation, on one hand, and to countenance the bullying and demeaning of a 
constitutional government as the time for free association appears to 
draw near, on the other, is to perpetrate a double bind and to demon-
strate its lingering ambivalence toward freedom and free association for 
Micronesia. ae The diminishing class of litigants represented by Otokichy 
symbolizes the diminishing American presence in the Federated States of 
Micronesia. The High Court should be summarily instructed to respect 
an emerging Government and to curtail its certiorari function. 
The final issue, whether the Supreme Court should respect and follow 
the High Court Otokichy precedent, was answered in the affirmative in an 
opinion delivered in August 1983. The Federated States Supreme Court, 
consisting of Associate Justice Benson and designated justices Dorothy 
W. Nelsona7 and Samuel P. King,l4e held in Jonas v. Supreme Court all 
that the High Court's authority to issue the Otokichy writ was legitimate, 
and that, "[T]his court cannot disregard an opinion resulting from such 
review."lIiO So concludes the saga of Otokichy, but not the fundamental 
isspe that it represents . 
... See Clark, supra note 12, at 6-7. "The United States has not shown great enthusiasm 
for the independence of Micronesia. The fear has been that United States security interests 
could not be adequately protected in an independent Micronesia." 
••• Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit . 
... Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. 
... 2 FSM Intrm. _ (App. Div. Aug. 15, 1983) (per curiam). 
'00 [d., slip op. at 6. 
